More Differentiated Special Treatment in the Agriculture Agreement: beyond concept to practice by Alan Matthews
IIIS Discussion Paper  
No.108/January 2006
More Differentiated Special Treatment in the Agriculture
Agreement: beyond concept to practice
Alan Matthews
Department of Economics
Institute for International Integration Studies
Trinity College, Dublin 
 








More Differentiated Special Treatment in the Agriculture 
















    Disclaimer 
   Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IIIS. 
   All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s).   
   Papers may only be downloaded for personal use only. 
  
 
More Differentiated Special Treatment in the Agriculture 
Agreement: beyond concept to practice 
 
Alan Matthews 
Department of Economics and Institute for International Integration Studies 






This paper examines how more differentiated special treatment of developing 
countries might be introduced into the WTO agriculture agreement following the 
Doha Round negotiations. The purpose of special treatment is to facilitate developing 
countries to meet their food security, rural development and livelihoods concerns. The 
paper first reviews previous attempts to classify developing countries into food-
insecure and food-secure groups. It argues that such a classification is mainly relevant 
in the market access pillar of the negotiations, as other criteria for differentiation are 
implicit in the July 2004 Framework Agreement proposals for the domestic support 
and export competition pillars. The prospects for an overall agreement are limited 
unless developed countries feel that they have gained improved access to the markets 
of the more advanced and competitive agricultural exporters among developing 
countries. The paper argues that the latter countries might be persuaded to accept 
shallower SDT if it is the condition for a significant market-opening offer by 
developed countries. In addition, the developed countries need to build support among 
low-income developing countries for differentiation by making clear what a more 
generous SDT offer to food-insecure developing countries not currently classified as 
LDCs would mean.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Special and differential treatment (SDT) was part of the Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994 but the substantive understanding of the term has 
grown since then. The preamble to that Agreement committed developed country 
Members, in implementing their commitments on market access, to “take fully into 
account the particular needs and conditions of developing country Members by 
providing for a greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for 
agricultural products of particular interest to these Members, including the fullest 
liberalization of trade in tropical agricultural products as agreed at the Mid-Term 
Review, and for products of particular importance to the diversification of production 
from the growing of illicit narcotic crops.”  It also noted that commitments under the 
reform programme should “[have] regard to the agreement that special and 
differential treatment for developing countries is an integral element of the 
negotiations, and [take] into account the possible negative effects of the 
implementation of the reform programme on  least-developed and net food-importing 
developing countries”.  These general precepts give little guidance as to the purpose 
or objective of SDT in the agricultural sector. 
 
Developing countries have argued that the balance of advantages in the URAA was 
very tilted towards the developed countries. When new negotiations started, a 
rebalancing of commitments was one of their main objectives. At the very beginning 
of the agriculture negotiations mandated by Article 20 of the URAA, in June 2000, a 
group of developing countries presented a proposal for a Development Box
 
which set 
out their broad objectives and concerns with respect to the negotiations, including the 
need to provide adequate flexibility for these countries to adopt measures to enhance 
domestic food production and protect the livelihoods of the rural poor and small 
farmers (WTO G/AG/NG/W/13). Underlying these proposals was the belief that 
indiscriminate trade liberalisation in agriculture negatively affects food security in 
developing countries and undermines the livelihoods of the rural poor, thus increasing 
poverty and inequality in the developing world.  
 
These concerns were reflected in Paragraph 13 (Agriculture) of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration which stated that “special and differential treatment for developing 
countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations […] so as to be 
operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively take account 
of their development needs, including food security and rural development.” SDT was 
seen not just as something required to ease the integration of developing countries 
into the trading system (by providing longer transition periods to cope with weaker 
adjustment capacities, for example), but in addition as something (possibly more 
permanent) which should be built into the rules themselves to enable developing 
countries to achieve their food security and rural development objectives. The General 
Council Decision on 1 August 2004 (the July Framework Agreement, or FA) was 
even more explicit that special treatment of developing countries is justified in order 
to address their food security, rural development, poverty reduction and livelihood 
concerns (Table 1). 
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Table 1.  General SDT objectives contained in the July 2004 Framework 
Agreement 
Paragraph 1  These [specific trade and development related needs and concerns] of 
developing countries, including relating to food security, rural 
development, livelihood, preferences, commodities and net food imports, 
as well as prior unilateral liberalisation, should be taken into consideration, 
as appropriate, in the course of the Agriculture and NAMA negotiations. 
Paragraph  2  …the modalities to be developed will need to incorporate operationally 
effective and meaningful provisions for special and differential treatment 
for developing country Members. Agriculture is of critical importance to 
the economic development of developing country Members and they must 
be able to pursue agricultural policies that are supportive of their 
development goals, poverty reduction strategies, food security and 
livelihood concerns. 
 
The demand for differentiation 
 
This broadening of the role for SDT in the agriculture agreement was accompanied by 
a growing demand to differentiate the special treatment accorded to developing 
countries, especially after the failure of the Cancún Ministerial (Paugam and Novel, 
2005).  In the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), commitments are differentiated on 
the same basis as in other WTO Agreements – between developed, developing and 
least developed countries.  However, the AoA did introduce a further category of Net 
Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs).
1 Although this is the only group to 
be defined on the basis of a specific food availability indicator, being a net food 
importer is poorly correlated with indicators of food security status (Diaz-Bonillo et 
al., 2002). The 23 NFIDCs are a diverse group with only three Low-Income countries, 
eleven Lower-Middle Income countries, 8 Upper-Middle Income countries and 1 
High-Income Country as classified by the World Bank (Kasteng et al., 2004). Too 
much should not be read into the NFIDC grouping as the commitments made in terms 
of technical and food aid assistance and the treatment of export credits are largely of a 
best-endeavour variety.  
 
Differentiation for the purposes of special treatment has been raised in general terms 
in the discussions on SDT in the Committee on Trade and Development.
2  However, 
the US-EU proposal in August 2003 was the first explicit proposal for differentiation 
between the developing countries in the agricultural negotiations (EU-USA, 2003). It 
said that substantial improvements in market access should be given to developing 
countries “most in need” but made no attempt to define this group. “Negotiations 
should therefore provide increased access opportunities for all and in particular for 
the developing countries most in need and take account of the importance of existing 
and future preferential access for developing countries”. It went on to state that 
“Having regard to their development and food security needs, developing countries 
                                                 
1 It is also worth noting that China was denied the full entitlement to developing country SDT on its 
accession to the WTO in that its domestic support de minimis was limited to 8½ per cent of its value of 
agricultural output rather than the agreed 10 per cent otherwise available to developing countries. 
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shall benefit from special and differential treatment, including lower tariff reductions 
and longer implementation periods”. On the other hand, the EU/US proposal also 
argued that “as far as S&D treatment for developing countries is concerned, the rules 
and disciplines will need to be adjusted for significant net food exporting countries 
[emphasis added].” 
 
This proposal was reiterated in US trade negotiator Robert Zoellick’s January 2004 
letter to his WTO colleagues after Cancún. This letter argued that “as we design 
flexibilities for countries or even types of countries or regions with special problems, 
we will be stymied if every provision automatically applies to some 100 or more 
countries -- including some that are highly competitive in a sector”. Specifically with 
reference to the agriculture negotiations, Zoellick proposed that the use of special 
products in agriculture should be restricted to “..certain developing countries that are 
concerned about harming rural development and subsistence farmers” while calling 
for “substantial openings in markets of developed and developing countries, 
especially those that are competitive in sectors of agriculture and with stronger 
economies” [emphasis added]. 
 
The Lamy-Fischler letter to WTO Members in May 2004 setting out the EU’s 
response to the Cancún failure echoed the same theme but in a more generous spirit. 
While stressing the need for greater commitments by the more competitive 
developing country exporters, they coupled this with a proposal to extend non-
reciprocity beyond the LDCs to the much wider group of the G-90.  “More generally, 
we have all accepted the principle of ‘less than full reciprocity’, but it needs to be 
made more operational. This means that developing countries should undertake 
commitments in line with their importance in world trade…. Therefore, on agriculture 
and NAMA, we propose that the least developed countries and other weak or 
vulnerable developing countries in a similar situation - essentially the G90 - should 
not have to open their markets beyond their existing commitments, and should be able 
to benefit from increased market access offered by both developed and advanced 
developing countries.”   
The new EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, reiterated the EU approach to 
the poorer developing countries in a speech in February 2005. His speech included the 
further suggestion, already built into the FA, that the more advanced developing 
countries, in turn, might offer SDT to other developing countries including the LDCs. 
“Europe will demand practically nothing from the poorest G90 countries in terms of 
market access, apart from some binding of tariffs. Last July’s Geneva framework is 
clear with regard to LDCs. By Hong Kong, we need to be clear too on what the 
developed countries are offering to all weak and vulnerable WTO members, who 
remain weak because of their dependence on preferences or their national 
Treasuries’ fears of loss of tariff revenue on which they depend. There must be real 
flexibility about the market opening commitments they are asked to enter into. Some 
should probably not be required to commit at all.” He went on to add that “… it is 
also an issue of whether advanced developing countries are willing, in turn, to open 
their markets, not only to us but also to the smaller developing countries, by cutting 
their high industrial tariffs and removing barriers to services.”  
Greater differentiation in the AoA?  
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Paugam and Novel (2005) identify three main arguments for greater differentiation. 
One is the “one size does not fit all” argument that differentiation would help to 
improve the efficiency of SDT provisions, In other words, the circumstances where 
general WTO rules conflict with or place a burden on underlying development 
objectives will be limited to countries with particular characteristics. The 
differentiation of rules should thus be limited to the group of countries likely to be 
adversely affected. Although they do not explicit state this, the assumption being 
made is that more far-reaching, deeper, SDT is likely to be agreed where the benefits 
are more targeted, and thus the direct costs to those agreeing in terms of market access 
foregone are less. In the case of agriculture, if the purpose of SDT is to improve a 
country’s ability to meet its food security, rural development and sustainable 
livelihoods goals, then it should be limited to those countries facing food insecurity 
and poor agricultural performance. 
 
A second argument is that trade policy may be a second best development instrument 
for countries with very weak institutions and resource base to tackle their 
development objectives. The threat of food insecurity to producers in the face of a 
sudden drop in world prices or an import surge provides a good example. While a first 
best solution might be to use market-based risk management mechanisms or insurance 
schemes or social safety nets to offset the income risk, these may simply be out of 
reach for very poor countries with many resource-poor farmers. The ability to 
implement safeguard tariffs may then be the only realistic option to provide relief in 
these circumstances. SDT is thus required to provide sufficient policy space for 
developing countries in these circumstances. 
 
A third argument is that targeting of SDT will reduce the negative externalities for 
others and the systemic or indirect costs of agreeing exemptions from general trade 
rules. Where SDT concessions are restricted to the poorer developing countries, 
because their share of world trade is low, the trade impacts will also be low.
3 Some 
observers fear that extensive SDT could prove a particular hindrance to the growth of 
South-South trade. 
 
Developing countries have to date resisted all efforts, both more generally within the 
WTO and specifically within the agriculture negotiations, to introduce differentiation. 
They perceive an interest in being grouped together as a bargaining force in the 
negotiations and that differentiation would undermine their influence, even though the 
existence of a variety of developing country groupings indicates that they do not all 
speak with one voice (FAO, 2005). Also, there is no mention of differentiation in the 
July Framework although there are references to commitments to address specific 
problems faced by sub-sets of countries, such as ‘recently acceded members’, 
‘economies where cotton has vital importance’, and the trade-related issues identified 
in Paragraph 35 of the Doha Work Programme for the fuller integration of small, 
vulnerable economics into the multilateral trading system. However, the Decision 
explicitly rules out in this latter connection the creation of a new sub-category of 
members. 
 
                                                 
3 However, even a small overall trade impact may have large consequences for a neighbouring small 
country as the country where access does not increase could be its major market or because it is 
excluded from the benefits of enhanced preferential access to higher-income markets where a 
competitor gains such access.   5
This does not mean that greater developing country differentiation for the purposes of 
agricultural disciplines is off the agenda. Greater differentiation is relevant in 
negotiating any of the individual modalities of the agriculture agreement. This paper 
explores the status of the individual negotiations to investigate the way in which 
greater differentiation might be implemented. This immediately raises the issue of 
what criteria for differentiation to apply. Paugam and Novel (2005) classify eligibility 
criteria into country-based approaches, agreement-specific or rule-based approaches, 
and a hybrid negotiated approach to differentiation. Country-based approaches refer 
to eligibility criteria based on geographic or broad socio-economic criteria. 
Agreement-specific approaches attempt to classify countries according to the 
particular SDT objectives in that agreement. In the case of the agriculture agreement, 
this would relate to indicators of food security or rural development need. Thus, we 
first survey in Section 2 the literature which has attempted to define groups of 
developing countries based on these agreement-specific criteria. Section 3 examines 
where greater differentiation might have a specific function in the individual 
modalities of the agricultural negotiations, taking into account what the July 2004 FA 
has to say on SDT. A possible way to break the deadlock on SDT is proposed in the 
concluding Section 4. 
 
Before beginning, it is necessary to confront one argument which bedevils discussion 
of SDT in agriculture. SDT measures cover preferential access to developed country 
markets, longer transitional periods to implementing commitments, permanent 
exemptions from agreed commitments in the spirit of non-reciprocity to provide 
greater policy space for developing countries, and promises of development 
assistance. There is strong disagreement over whether greater flexibility in WTO rules 
(to allow greater policy autonomy or policy space in the formulation of agricultural 
trade and support policies) would actually contribute to the desired goals of increased 
food security and rural development.
4 We do not attempt to answer this question in 
this paper, concentrating instead on the realpolitik of responding to developing 
country demands for more operationally effective SDT measures if they are to be 
persuaded to sign up to a new Agreement.
5 
 
2.  Designing criteria for SDT eligibility 
 
In this section, we look briefly at ways in which greater differentiation might be 
introduced into the commitments undertaken in the agriculture agreement. We survey 
a number of suggested approaches in the literature, ranging from the use of simple per 
capita income measures to more complex statistical techniques. Using the suggested 
classification outcome from one comprehensive study conducted by the Swedish 
Board of Agriculture (Kasteng et al, 2004), we explore the political economy barriers 
to going further down this road in a new agreement.  
 
                                                 
4  Reflecting this sceptical view, the European Communities (2002) notes that “All SDT proposals 
should be evaluated against the following basic criterion : will this aid the economic development of 
developing countries and their fuller integration of developing countries into the trading system, as 
opposed to creating what has been described as permanent exclusion or second tier Membership of 
the system?” 
5 The arguments are reviewed in Matthews, 2005.  
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Using per capita income to rank countries is an obvious way to differentiate countries 
according to their ability to take on additional commitments. One approach has been 
suggested by the International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council which has 
proposed a three-fold distinction based in a modified way on the distinctions drawn 
by the World Bank and the IMF based on per capita income (IPC, 2004).  But while 
the World Bank distinguishes between low income, lower middle income and upper 
middle income developing countries, the IPC proposes to distinguish between least 
developed countries, lower middle income and upper middle income countries. The 
LDC grouping would be based on the UN definition (which includes institutional 
constraints as well as per capita income) but, in addition, would include all countries 
with a per capita income less than $900 (the World Bank uses a threshold of $765 per 
capita to distinguish between low income and lower middle income countries). It also 
suggests a flexible mechanism whereby countries facing particular constraints, such 
as small island states, land-locked countries or vulnerable economies, could apply for 
classification into the next lower category if their per capita income does not take into 
account unique vulnerabilities. It then argues that the degree of SDT treatment should 
be differentiated over these three groups, rather than two as at present. For example, 
with respect to market access, it suggests that upper middle income countries should 
accept the same tariff reductions as developed countries but with a longer 
implementation period, the lower middle income countries might be offered both 
lower reduction commitments and a longer implementation period, while LDCs 
would not be required to make reduction commitments.  
 
Alternative approaches focus more directly on the food security objectives of SDT in 
the agriculture agreement and seek to explicitly distinguish between food insecure, 
food neutral and food secure countries. Food security is here being defined at the 
national level, but there is no consensus on how to do this. Ruffer et al. (2002) 
examine the classification of countries on the basis of seven plausible criteria to 
define a food insecure country. These criteria include GDP per capita; the 
contribution of agriculture to GDP; calories or protein per capita; the FAO 
classification of Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries which takes into account a 
combination of GNP per capita and the net food trade position of a country (based on 
calories traded, not value); and the ratio of total exports (including merchandise and 
services) to food imports. For the continuous variables, each indicator is associated 
with a threshold to determine a country’s food security status. They find that only 
seven countries (of which only four are WTO members) meet all criteria for food 
insecure countries where data exists! This indicates that the classification question is 
not an innocent technical question but is likely to prove highly controversial.  
 
Also starting from the concept of national food insecurity, Stevens and Kennan (2003) 
(building on earlier papers by Stevens 2002a, 2002b) link calorie supply, agricultural 
dependence, export market share and vulnerability to identify countries with the 
greatest potential need to support their domestic agricultural sector (and, hence, not to 
be restricted in the use of subsidies) and those most vulnerable to world market 
changes that would follow significant OECD liberalisation (and hence in need of 
adjustment support).  
 
Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2000) use various methods of cluster analysis for 167 countries to 
identify groups of countries categorised according to five measures of food security: 
food production per capita, the ratio of total exports to food imports, calories per   7
capita, protein per capita, and the share of the non-agricultural population.
6 Their 
results identify 12 clusters of countries according to their similarities in their food 
security profiles. On the basis of the identified clusters, countries are placed in one of 
the following three categories: (1) food secure; (2) food neutral, and (3) food secure. 
Their classification of food insecure countries covers almost all LDCs, with the 
exceptions of Cape Verde, Maldives and Myanmar. However, their system of 
differentiation also includes in the food insecure group many countries not covered by 
the Marrakesh Decision which distinguishes LDCs and the NFIDCs.  
 
In a study for the Swedish Board of Agriculture, Kasteng et al. (2004) take this 
classification as their starting point to develop a typology of developing countries 
which separates out two further groups of developing countries. The first is a group of 
high income advanced developing countries, generally with low dependence on 
agriculture, which in their view “might be given the same conditions as the developed 
countries in the field of agriculture”. The second is a group of significant net food 
exporting countries, as suggested in the EU/US proposal presented before the Cancún 
Ministerial. Using a classification developed by the WTO Committee on Agriculture 
of significant exporters which are countries representing more than five per cent of 
the total global export of a certain product or product group, they identify nine 
developing countries which fall into this category. However, as four of these countries 
fall into the food insecure group as defined by Diaz-Bonilla et al, and a fifth is Hong 
Kong which overall is a significant net food importer (it is included in this group 
because its share of world exports of poultrymeat exceeds the five per cent threshold), 
this leaves just four countries which they classify as net agricultural exporters: 
Argentina, Brazil, China and Thailand. The overall system of differentiation proposed 
by the Kasteng et al. study is shown in Table 2.  
 
The table illustrates the nature of the deal which has to be made if greater 
differentiation is to become a reality in the agriculture agreement. Essentially a group 
of advanced developing countries and a smaller group of significant net agricultural 
exporting developing countries would be asked to forgo taking advantage of SDT 
measures to which they might otherwise be entitled under the July 2004 Framework 
Agreement. Two elements are necessary to persuade them to do this. For the 
significant net agricultural exporting developing countries, they may be prepared to 
accept this condition if it unlocks a significant market-opening offer by the developed 
countries from which they will benefit. To persuade the other advanced developing 
countries, the developed countries would have to make clear that this would lead to 
deeper SDT measures being offered to a wider group of low- and middle-income 
developing countries than just the LDCs that are defined to suffer from food 
insecurity.  
 
                                                 
6 The threshold values are used in the Díaz-Bonilla et al (2000) study: (1) food insecure: food 
production/capita: US$ 81.8; food import capacity: 20.4%; calories/capita/day: 1982.9; 
protein/capita/day (in grams): 48.6; non-agricultural population: 23%; (2) food neutral: food 
production/capita: US$ 210.4; food import capacity: 8.8% calories/capita/day: 2602.3; 
protein/capita/day (in grams): 66.5; non-agricultural population: 75%; (3) food secure: food 
production/capita: US$ 254.2; food import capacity: 5.4% calories/capita/day: 3231.3; 
protein/capita/day(in grams): 100.1; non-agricultural population: 8.8%. 
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Table 2. Differentiation between developing countries : Swedish Board of 
Agriculture proposals 
  Low income Countries  Middle-Income Countries  High-Income Countries 




Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), 
Congo (Kinshasa), Cote 
d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Haiti, India, Kenya, 
Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao 
Tome & Principe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon 
Islands, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
 
Albania, Armenia, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Iraq, Maldives, 
Namibia, Peru, Philippines, 
Seychelles, Sri Lanka, St. 
Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 




Developing countries with 
special need for rural 
development 
Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldavia, Nigeria, Uzbekistan 
Algeria, Belize, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Fiji, Gabon, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Lebanon, Macedonia (FYR), 
Malaysia, Morocco, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, 
Saudi Arabia, Serbia & 
Montenegro, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad 










    Antigua & Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, 
Brunei, Hong Kong, Israel, 
Kuwait, Macao, Oman, 
Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, United Arab 
Emirates 
Developed countries, 
including observer countries 
 Belarus,  Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, South Africa, 
Ukraine 
Andorra, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
USA. 
Explanations to the table: Countries in bold: LDC category. Countries underlined: WTO developed 
countries category. WTO members not included due to lack of data: Bahrain, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, 
Macao, Oman, Qatar, Singapore, Taiwan. WTO observers not included due to lack of data: Andorra, 
Bahamas, Bhutan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Holy See (Vatican), Iraq, Samoa, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Serbia & Montenegro, Tonga.  
Source:  Kasteng et al., 2004. 
 
If this political deal was made, a number of technical issues would still need to be 
clarified to make it operational in a new agreement. More simple and transparent 
objective criteria to distinguish between the food insecure countries, including LDCs, 
and developing countries with a special need for rural development, would need to be   9
developed which nonetheless produced more or less the same ranking of countries. 
This would also facilitate the development of graduation criteria which are a 
necessary accompaniment to any move to greater differentiation. In the following 
section, we turn to examine where such a more differentiated classification of 
developing countries might be applied in the negotiations on a new agriculture 
agreement. 
 
3.  Applying greater differentiation in the agriculture agreement 
 
Market access  
 
By common consent, the market access pillar is proving the most difficult to 
negotiate. The FA set out a number of agreed principles to guide the negotiations. 
These were: a high level of ambition in the overall outcome; that highest tariffs would 
be reduced the most; that a tiered approach would be used; that special treatment 
would apply to sensitive products; and that SDT would apply to developing countries. 
However, no numbers were provided to show how these principles would be made 
operational. The SDT provisions under this pillar are summarised in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  SDT provisions relating to market access in the July Framework 
Paragraphs 27 
and 29 
Members also agreed that special and differential treatment for developing 
Members would be an integral part of all elements in the [market access] 
negotiations…. Each Member (other than LDCs) will make a contribution. 
Operationally effective special and differential provisions for developing 
country Members will be an integral part of all elements. 
Paragraph 39  Having regard to their rural development, food security and/or livelihood 
security needs, special and differential treatment for developing countries 
will be an integral part of all elements of the negotiation, including the 
tariff reduction formula, the number and treatment of sensitive products, 
expansion of tariff rate quotas, and implementation period. 
Paragraph 40  Proportionality will be achieved by requiring lesser tariff reduction 
commitments or tariff quota expansion commitments from developing 
country Members. 
Paragraph 41  Developing country Members will have the flexibility to designate an 
appropriate number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of 
food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. These 
products will be eligible for more flexible treatment. The criteria and 
treatment of these products will be further specified during the negotiation 
phase and will recognize the fundamental importance of Special Products 
to developing countries. 
Paragraph 42  A Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) will be established for use by 
developing country Members. 
Paragraph 43  Full implementation of the long-standing commitment to achieve the fullest 
liberalisation of trade in tropical agricultural products and for products of 
particular importance to the diversification of production from the growing 
of illicit narcotic crops is overdue and will be addressed effectively in the 
market access negotiations. 
 
Since then, a number of proposals have been made regarding the structure of an 
appropriate formula, including submissions by the G20, Canada, Australia, the US 
and the EU. In the absence of numbers, the likely outcomes from these proposals 
cannot be compared. The G20 proposal can be seen as forging a middle ground   10
between the radical liberalisers (such as the US and the Cairns Group, which 
advocated the use of the Swiss formula with a low tariff cap) and the reluctant 
liberalisers (such as the G10 and the EU who favoured the Uruguay Round approach). 
The outcomes are further complicated by the provision in the FA concerning sensitive 
products. The debate on sensitive products is linked to the degree of flexibility 
included in the tariff reduction formula. To ensure a significant degree of market 
opening, it is accepted that tariff rate quotas (TRQs) would have to be increased to 
compensate for a lower tariff reduction. However, there is disagreement about 
whether the tariff reduction/TRQ expansion combination should be related to the 
main formula for tariff reduction or not.  
 
Tariff reduction formulae and policy space 
 
As noted, many developing countries want to retain the maximum amount of policy 
space to pursue domestic food and agricultural policy objectives. Leaving aside the 
LDCs where there is already agreement that they will not be asked to make tariff 
reduction commitments, an important issue for other developing countries is how to 
reconcile a harmonising formula approach to tariff reductions with special and 
differential treatment. SDT in the Uruguay Round (UR) meant that commitments by 
developing countries averaged two-thirds of those undertaken by developed countries. 
If this is to be repeated in the Doha Round, the question is whether this commitment 
is built into the formula to be used or into the objective to be achieved. There is great 
variation in initial tariff structures across countries, with many developing countries 
which opted for ceiling bindings having much higher bound rates than developed 
countries. Application of a differentiated formula could even lead to the perverse 
outcome whereby poorer developing countries are asked to make proportionately 
greater reductions given the initial structure of their tariffs.
7  
 
Interpreting the actual outcome of any formula for an individual developing country is 
complicated, as for developed countries, by the number and treatment of sensitive 
products which will be allowed. According to the FA (paragraph 39), developing 
countries will benefit from special and differential treatment (SDT) in the designation 
and treatment of sensitive products. This would imply that these countries may 
designate more sensitive products and undertake lesser commitments with respect to 
tariff reductions and tariff rate quota expansion than may otherwise be required.  
 
Because of the rather arbitrary way in which the average cuts required of developing 
countries will be distributed under any of the formulae publicly proposed to date, the 
scope for applying greater rule-based differentiation is not clear. One way to get 
around this conundrum would be for each country to place its tariff into three (or 
more) tiers, where the reduction coefficient is decided for each tier but the thresholds 
are flexible and determined in such a way that the overall reduction (including taking 
sensitive products into account) meets the average target established for the country 
group with which a country is associated. This would allow the average target to be 
differentiated according to a country’s food security status if appropriate eligibility 
criteria were agreed.  
 
                                                 
7 See Matthews, forthcoming, for further discussion. Examples of differing tariff structures for 
individual countries are given in Jales et al., 2005.   11
Special Products 
 
In addition to being able to designate sensitive products, the FA foresees (paragraph 
41) that “Developing country Members will have the flexibility to designate an 
appropriate number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food 
security, livelihood security and rural development needs. These products will be 
eligible for more flexible treatment.” This guarantees that developing countries will 
have access to this flexibility in a revised agreement on agriculture and it clarifies that 
the basic criteria that should guide the designation of SPs will be food and livelihood 
security, and rural development needs. On the other hand, the text establishes limits to 
the possible scope of SPs, for instance, by requiring that only an appropriate number 
of products can be so designated. How this number should be determined is left to 
further negotiation, as is the treatment of SPs.  
 
From the point of view of greater differentiation, the key issue is whether all 
developing countries should have the same potential access to SPs, regardless of how 
defined or how treated. Two criteria to limit the number have been proposed:  a 
certain number of tariff lines, or imports accounting for a certain proportion of the 
value of imports. The latter would allow a country to choose between a small number 
of products accounting for a sizeable share of imports, or a larger number of less 
significant products in import value terms. Ruffer (2003) suggests varying these 
numbers by the level of per capita income. Alternatively, the criteria for choosing 
special products could be made more generous for more food insecure countries.   
Note that even holding the same threshold for all countries would imply some 
differentiation in practice. Small countries with undiversified production may only 
need a small number of SPs to provide significant protection to their domestic 
agriculture; a larger country with a more diversified agriculture may need a larger 
number of SPs.  To the extent that smaller countries are more likely to be food 
insecure, some desirable differentiation would occur in practice even if the same 
thresholds were applied to all developing countries. 
 
Special Safeguard Mechanism 
 
Developing countries have worried that trade liberalisation could leave them 
vulnerable to import surges or a price collapse on world markets, in a situation where 
they have very limited ability to protect producers through purely internal measures. 
Paragraph 42 of the FA states that "a special safeguard mechanism (SSM) will be 
established for use by developing country Members.” While this represents substantial 
progress by developing countries in the negotiations to date, no guidance is given as 
to the design of this mechanism. 
 
The G33, an alliance of developing countries formed to promote the need for an SSM 
and SPs, has argued that an SSM should have the following features: the safeguard 
measure should be automatically triggered; it should be available to all agricultural 
products; both price and volume-triggered safeguards should be considered; both 
additional duties and quantitative restrictions should be available as remedies; and the 
mechanism should be simple, effective and easy to implement. On the other hand, 
developed countries (and some developing countries) have argued for restricted 
product coverage and more limited triggers and remedies. 
   12
The disagreements in relation to product eligibility revolve around a number of issues: 
whether to limit SSM use to a specific number of tariff lines or allow access by all 
tariff lines; whether to use multilaterally agreed, development-related criteria or to 
allow self-designation; and whether access to the SSM should be related either to the 
depth of the tariff cuts and/or the final level of the bound tariff. Developed countries 
suggest that the SSM should apply only to staple food products or products necessary 
for food security that are produced in the developing country concerned, and to 




Greater differentiation could apply to various elements of the SSM. Food-insecure 
countries could be allowed to designate a greater number of eligible products, or 
could be allowed easier triggers, or could be allowed to apply stronger remedies, or 
for a longer duration. The most likely element for differentiation concerns the number 
of eligible products. All products might be deemed eligible for food-insecure 
countries, while more advanced developing countries might be restricted to a limited 
number. The general discussion on the criteria for differentiation in the previous 
section remains relevant here.  
 
Domestic support  
 
Few developing countries have entitlements to provide trade-distorting domestic 
support beyond de minimis levels. The FA (paragraph 6) recognises that “Special and 
differential treatment remains an integral component of domestic support. Modalities 
to be developed will include longer implementation periods and lower reduction 
coefficients for all types of trade-distorting domestic support and continued access to 
the provisions under Article 6.2.” It also states (Paragraph 11) that “Reductions in de 
minimis will be negotiated taking into account the principle of special and differential 
treatment. Developing countries that allocate almost all de minimis programmes for 
subsistence and resource-poor farmers will be exempt”. Crucially, this goes beyond 
the exemptions in Article 6.2 in allowing coupled direct payment programmes if a 
country has the budget resources and sees a need for these. 
 
It is unlikely that further differentiation beyond that implied by this exemption for 
targeted domestic support will be sought or required, as the current de minimis 
provisions for developing countries are quite generous.
9 The FA, in fact, makes it 
possible for DCs to agree to a reduction in de minimis levels, knowing that for the 
majority such a reduction would have no impact in practice. This is because the bulk 
of their de minimis support is allocated to subsistence and resource-poor farmers.  
FAO (2005) acknowledges that defining these terms is problematic, both conceptually 
and in terms of data availability. It suggest that countries with more than a specified 
proportion of their population (say 50%) working in agriculture and with a certain 
                                                 
8 The 2003 US-EU joint proposal stated that a special agricultural safeguard (SSM) shall be established 
for use by developing countries as regards import-sensitive tariff lines. 
 
9  FAO (2005) interprets this provision to mean that national and multilateral programmes specifically 
targeted at subsistence and resource-poor farmers would receive additional SDT beyond that prescribed 
for all developing countries. But a plain reading of the text suggests that developing countries where 
these farmers are the main focus of domestic support avoid reductions in de minimis levels, but do not 
get to increase them beyond these levels.   13
proportion of the population with income below a certain level would automatically 
qualify for exemption under this heading. Whatever the criteria, the point is that a 
workable means of differentiation has been established in the domestic support pillar, 




Because few developing countries are entitled to use export subsidies, they have few 
defensive interests in this pillar (see Table 3 for a list of relevant SDT provisions in 
the Framework Agreement). However, developing countries are likely to continue to 
want to make use of price intervention schemes as part of their agricultural policy. 
Experience in Europe shows how difficult it can be to keep support prices in line with 
market trends. Where countries build up stocks as a result of price stabilisation or 
price guarantee policies, the issue of how to dispose of surpluses will arise. The FA 
allows developing countries to continue to provide (for a period to be negotiated) 
export subsidies for transport and marketing as allowed under Article 9.4 of the 
existing Agreement on Agriculture. Some developing countries have proposed 
expanding the types of export subsidies they are allowed to use under Article 9.4. 
They want to see exemptions along the lines of Article 27 and Annex 7 of the 
Subsidies Agreement (which allow developing countries with a per capita GNP less 
than $1,000 to provide export subsidies, as well as longer phase-out periods for other 
developing countries). Differentiation for any such extension would be meaningless 
as it is only the more advanced developing countries that are in a position to 
contemplate subsidising their exports in the first place.   
 




Paragraph 22  Developing country Members will benefit from longer implementation 
periods for the phasing out of all forms of export subsidies. 
Paragraph 23  Developing countries will continue to benefit from special and differential 
treatment under the provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture for a reasonable period, to be negotiated, after the phasing out 
of all forms of export subsidies and implementation of all disciplines 
identified above are completed. 
Paragraph 24  Members will ensure that the disciplines on export credits, export credit 
guarantees or insurance programs to be agreed will make appropriate 
provision for differential treatment in favour of least-developed and net 
food-importing developing countries as provided for in paragraph 4 of the 
Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the 
Reform Programme on Least- Developed and Net Food-Importing 
Developing Countries. 
Paragraph 25  STEs in developing country Members which enjoy special privileges to 
preserve domestic consumer price stability and to ensure food security will 
receive special consideration for maintaining monopoly status. 
Paragraph 26  In exceptional circumstances, which cannot be adequately covered by food 
aid, commercial export credits or preferential international financing 
facilities, ad hoc temporary financing arrangements relating to exports to 
developing countries may be agreed by Members. 
 
Other developing countries are concerned that the disciplines on export competition 
measures, including export credits and food aid, could have negative implications for   14
meeting humanitarian and development needs. The FA states that such disciplines will 
provide for differential treatment in favour of the least developed and net food 
importing countries, without compromising the objective of eliminating their trade-
distorting effects. It refers to the Marrakesh Decision in favour of these countries to 
maintain food aid levels, but without acknowledging the structural flaws in the 
Decision that have prevented its implementation.  
 
Some developing countries also have interests in the State Trading Enterprises (STE) 
debate. Although state marketing boards are now much less prevalent in developing 
countries than used to be the case, disciplines on the financing of STEs, and on the 
use of monopoly export powers, will affect some countries. Kenya has proposed that 
developing country STEs be exempt from disciplines because of the role they play in 
development. The FA proposes that “STEs in developing country Members which 
enjoy special privileges to preserve domestic consumer price stability and to ensure 
food security will receive special consideration for maintaining monopoly status”. 
Given this qualification on the bodies eligible for special treatment, differentiation 
does not appear to be an issue in this area either. 
 
Least developed countries and other poor developing countries 
 
The FA recognises more differentiated special treatment for LDCs in two ways 
(Paragraph 45). First, LDCs are not required to undertake reduction commitments. 
Second,  there is an exhortation that developed Members, and developing country 
Members in a position to do so, should extend duty-free and quota-free access to 
LDCs.  
 
Implicit in this latter exhortation is some form of differentiation on a voluntary basis, 
although the best-endeavour language means that it is a very soft commitment. 
Nonetheless, it could be build upon in various ways. For example, the EU has 
proposed that the exemption from undertaking reduction commitments should be 
extended to other low-income developing countries, generally interpreted to be the G-
90. It has also gone further than the FA text and proposed that duty-free and quota-
free access be offered to all low income countries, and not just the LDCs.  Very little 
attention or analysis has been given to this potentially radical proposal, giving the 
impression that the EU does not take it very seriously. Yet it does suggest a way 
forward from the current impasse, as discussed in the concluding section. In either 
case, a clear legal definition of the G90-similar countries based on objective criteria of 




Special and differential treatment has the potential to emerge as a major stumbling 
block to the successful conclusion of the Doha Round agricultural negotiations. On 
the one hand, without further differentiation of the beneficiaries of special treatment, 
developed countries are unlikely to offer much beyond rather shallow SDT and will 
also be reluctant to make a significant market-opening offer. On the other hand, low-
income developing countries may veto an agreement if they feel that it does not 
provide them with the policy space they believe to be necessary to pursue their food 
security, rural development and poverty alleviation objectives. 
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This paper explores how greater differentiation of special treatment for developing 
countries might be applied within the agreement on agriculture under negotiation in 
the Doha Round. Although greater differentiation has been proposed primarily by the 
developed countries as a way of limiting the cost to them of extending SDT, it would 
be a desirable outcome if it encouraged the offer to low-income developing countries 
of more operationally effective SDT by the developed (and possibly, more advanced 
developing) countries, and because it would limit the collateral damage of deeper 
SDT if fewer countries were able to avail of it. 
 
SDT in the agriculture agreement is increasingly justified in the context of its 
contribution to promoting food security, poverty alleviation and rural development.  
This suggests that any attempt to differentiate further between developing countries 
should seek to do so on the basis of food security and agricultural performance data. 
One immediate issue is that indicators of food security are not necessarily relevant to 
judging rural development needs. Even focusing on a single criterion, such as food 
security, does not make the selection of countries easier, as studies have shown that a 
country’s food security standing is greatly influenced by the particular indicator used 
to measure this status. Naturally, WTO member countries armed with the information 
on how well they will do from the negotiations beforehand will have every incentive 
to select an index which shows their case in a favourable light. Differentiation also 
has the potential to create a moral hazard problem if it encouraged developing 
countries to neglect food security and agricultural development policies so as to avoid 
the requirement to take on more onerous WTO disciplines. 
 
One way to reduce the impact of index sensitivity is to have a larger number of 
eligible tiers but with stepped percentages for the reduction commitments or 
exemptions from rules which are ultimately agreed. This would minimise the adverse 
effects of falling outside a favoured group, and thus minimise the extent of lobbying 
in the event of an unfavourable outcome. It would also minimise the moral hazard 
problem, but at a much heavier transactions cost for the negotiations.  
 
Our review of the state of the negotiations has shown that the FA already includes a 
mechanism for greater differentiation in the domestic support pillar if the political will 
was there to use it. A mechanism for differentiation in the export competition pillar 
has also been agreed in the few areas where it might be relevant (retaining the 
monopoly status of export STEs and protecting vulnerable countries from any 
prohibition on export credits). It is in the market access area (either defensively, in 
terms of maximising the policy space available to a developing country, or 
offensively, in terms of granting more favourable preferential access) where the 
means for greater differentiation remains unclear. In effect, the controversial areas are 
the size of the overall tariff reduction commitments, the number of special products 
and access to the special safeguard mechanism.  
 
The empirical work shows that differentiation criteria can be devised, if there is 
evidence of political will to continue down this road. The difficulty is that it is not 
obvious why the more advanced developing countries should accept differentiation. 
They are likely to be offered only shallow SDT in any case. In the mercantilist world 
of WTO trade negotiations, the more advanced developing countries would 
immediately face what would be perceived as greater costs of membership with 
nothing to show in return. Paugam and Novel (2005) suggest that the way to break   16
this deadlock is to refer negotiators to one unique compass: the consideration of the 
potentially positive development impact of greater differentiation.  
 
Presumably the main incentive for the more competitive agricultural exporters among 
the developing countries (the four countries Argentina, Brazil, China and Thailand 
identified by Kasteng et al., 2004) is significantly enhanced market access to 
developed country markets. If this offer of significantly enhanced market access is 
dependent on these countries also making significant commitments, these countries 
may be prepared to accept this trade-off. Most of the other more advanced developing 
countries are not agricultural exporters and would not benefit from a significant 
market-opening offer in agriculture. It needs to be brought home to these countries 
that their insistence on availing of extensive SDT puts in jeopardy a more generous 
SDT offer for low-income countries.  
 
One way to do this is for the developed countries to outline the more ambitious SDT 
offers they are prepared to make to recognise developing countries’ concerns on food 
security and rural development; in return, the more advanced developing countries 
could make clear that they would not seek to make use of these greater flexibilities. A 
more ambitious SDT offer should recognise that many low-income countries (and not 
just LDCs) are food-insecure (perhaps embracing the EU offer to give the G-90 
countries the round ‘for free’), and accept that even food-neutral developing countries 
will have rural development goals which could justify rule exemptions. Such an offer 
could help encourage the more vulnerable developing countries to break ranks and to 
put pressure on the more advanced developing countries to reach a deal. Without the 
framework for a more generous SDT package on the table, it is hard to see what 
incentive there is for the more advanced developing countries to forego the benefits of 
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